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author's intention? In the last chapter he marks the fulfillment of
his intention by noting that fewer voters participate in primaries
in the South than in other sections of the country and that "these
figures refute better than rhetoric the Southern apologists who
maintain that the South is as democratic as other sections and
that its democratic participation comes in the primaries rather
than in the general election." (p. 103) If the extent to which a
political system is democratic is determined by the number of
people who bother to participate in elections, Professor Ewing
could have fulfilled his intention on one page with one simple
table and one line of text. In view of this, the thousands of statistics presented seem adventitious to the intention, or the intention
is adventitiously imposed on the statistics. If it is important to
know how many candidates enter Democratic primary contests
for state auditor, or which office attracts the most candidates
throughout the South, it would be more convenient to be informed by a handbook of election statistics, or an election almanac, and be spared a commentary which does nothing to illuminate the statistics.
On the last two pages Professor Ewing deals with questions
of interest to anyone concerned with southern politics, and here,
venturing opinions as to the future, he has been proved wrong
by subsequent events. But this failure to predict correctly, it
should be pointed out, in no way invalidates the conclusions
reached by his study, since the prediction has nothing to do with
the study.
Walter F. Berns, Jr.*
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Corresponding to the lifelong interest of Professor Giacometti,
the accent of the Festgabe centers around the relation between
the political process and the Rechtsstaat concept. A number of
contributions are on specific problems of Swiss law and legal
history by Maurice Batelli, Andr6 Grisel, Jakob Wackernagel
and one by Hans Peters on German post-war constitutional developments. The other articles are more or less focused on the
* Assistant Professor of Government, Louisiana State University.
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major theme. There are two contributions from the Vienna
school: Hans Kelsen gives a concise and vigorous restatement
of his well known position; Adolf Merkl shows what great variety of forms an individual state-organization may take and yet
be counted among the Rechtsstaat-family; yet, at the same time
he, nevertheless, endeavors to draw a precise enough boundary
line between the countless variants and admixtures of the constitutional regime, which guarantees political freedom, and the
totalitarian travesties of the concept. The articles of Hans Huber
on "The Decline of the Law and the Crisis of the Rechtsstaat"
and of Werner Kaegi on "Rechtsstaat and Democracy" develop a
more fundamentally critical position in regard to present day
institutions. Starting from a conservative criticism of positivist
legality in present day mass society, Huber arrives at a straight
antithesis between the conservative character of the law and the
dynamics of changing mass needs, under the impact of which
the law degrades to "voluntarism without a compass needle."
In the same vein, Kaegi sees the main aberration of our time in
what he calls "the decisionist-totalitarian concept of democracy."
He tries to work out limits to popular and legislative action as
necessitated by the maintenance of a more than merely formal
Rechtsstaat concept.
Huber in his provocative contribution criticizes especially the
diminishing sense of legality, the cleavage between administrative practice and legal and constitutional provisions and the
general overburdening of the legal system. Yet, at the same time,
frequent present day recourse to collective agreement finds
equally little favor with him. Such attitude smacks a little of
romanticism. In his justified strictures of the handling or mishandling of the law by the administrative bureaucracy, he overlooks that mass society's only chance of escaping increasing state
regulation lies in the extension of group autonomy including
self-determination of inter-group relations. If this involves some
loss of individual freedom through withdrawal of the state from
ordering relations between individual and group, it at the same
time enhances the chance that the individual receives some form
of effective participation in the formation of those decisions which
are least remote from his daily concerns.
Similar reservations may be raised in regard to the equally
provocative paper of Kaegi. The author's contention that democracy has a special calling for the Rechtsstaat and that there exist
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particular possibilities for its realization seems open to some
qualification. Historical experience has shown that realization
of the goals of the Rechtsstaat, the maintenance of specific
forms and procedures as guarantors of the fundamental rights
and freedoms of the citizen, has been easier to achieve under the
conditions of the older type of parliamentary and constitutional
regime, with its restricted popular participation in the political
process than under a mass democracy. The very attempt to
extend the reign of the Rechtsstaat concept to the mass society
has produced strains unknown to the halcyon days of the nineteenth century. Equally buffeted in by the popular sovereign,
the executive and the private group, the non-affiliated individual's chance to see his claims vindicated have lessened considerably.
Yet, curiously enough, in Switzerland, in spite of its intermingling of parliamentary procedure and direct democracy, the
main challenge to the Rechtsstaat has emanated less from
attempts at popular or legislative usurpation of power than from
the systematic enlargement of executive prerogatives. Therefore
it is small wonder that the remaining three articles by Max
Imboden on "Municipal Autonomy and the Rechtsstaat," Hans
Nawiasky on "Direct Democracy," and especially Hans Nef on
the "Progress of Swiss Democracy" evince little fear of arrogation of vast and possibly unconstitutional powers by the sovereign
people. Hans Nef goes even so far as to consider extension of
direct democracy by way of introducing the device of a federal
initiative for simple bills rather than-as under the present
arrangement-only for constitutional amendments. For this reason Kaegi's temperamental discourse against the abuse of democratic omnipotence and the identification of majority rule and
the dictates of justice might give the erroneous impression that
the author has grievous misgivings against the working of direct
democracy in Switzerland. This is not the case. He recognizes
that under Swiss constitutional and political conditions the rule
of, the strictly general character of the law must undergo some
exceptions in favor of allowing the sovereign people to make
individual decisions in cases of far-reaching importance. He
equally concedes, though only in a footnote, that the Achilles
heel of the present day Swiss constitutional system rests in the
over-extension of the powers of the executive to the detriment of
both the legislature and the process of direct democracy.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

VOL. XIV

Summing up, both Huber and Kaegi try to prove too much,
at least insofar as their own bailiwick, the Swiss Confederation,
is concerned. The tendencies which they describe and decry so
vividly are less present under the conditions of Swiss society
than under many other contemporary governments. Yet, foresight is better than hindsight. And we have all reason to be
grateful to all those who familiarize us with their present
thoughts and concerns on that elusive jewel, the Rechtsstaat.
Otto Kirchheimer*
THE DOCTRINE OF UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT IN THE LAW OF THE
PROVINCE OF QUEBEC [McGill Legal Studies No. 2], by George
S. Challies. Wilson and Lafleur, Limited, Montreal, 2d ed.
1952, pp. xii, 216.
This second edition brings up to date and in certain chapters
considerably amplifies the original edition of 1940. Ordinarily a
second edition merits a book note, but not a review, much less
one appearing almost two years after its publication. This book,
however, is the only detailed monograph in the English language
on the development and substance of the action for unjustified
enrichment in French and Quebec law;1 as such it can be of
tremendous influence to the good in Louisiana, where the basic
law is so similar, but where this particular subject is all but
unknown.
The principle of unjustified enrichment, that no one should
be enriched at the expense of another without justification, is the
foundation for much that is in any system of law, for it is a
corollary of the virtue of justice. Precisely because it is a basic
principle, it is applicable to phenomena far too numerous and
too varied to permit its abstract statement to serve as a rule of
law for all of them, and its articulation for the most part necessarily is in terms of specific rules of law for particular situations.
Thus Justice Challies can list sixty-four articles of the Quebec
Civil Code which he considers founded on the principle, though
* Dr. iur., Washington, D. C.
1. John P. Dawson's "Unjust Enrichment-A Comparative Analysis"
(Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1951), is a splendid book on the level of
comparative legal science, designed to provoke thought on the problem in
Anglo-American law. It contains an account of the action for unjust enrichment in France sufficient for the author's purpose, but it is not a treatise on
the subject, as is Justice Challies' book.

